6 июня 2011 МФД-ИнфоЦентр
Zero Hedge регулярно публикует прогнозы от Goldman Sachs, отдавая дань глубокого уважения главному дилеру мирового финансового казино. Питомцы GS занимают ключевые посты в государственных финансовых структурах Нового и Старого Света. Уильям Дадли – бывший главный экономист GS, нынче заместитель Бернанке и глава ФРБ Нью-йорка, который, как известно, играет исключительную роль в проведении монетарной политики Федрезерва. Другой главный экономист GS – европейского подразделения, стал недавно членом совета директоров ЦБ Великобритании.
Они везде. Goldman Sachs не прочь даже возглавить превращение России в мировой финансовый центр
Goldman Sachs является наиболее «инновационной» компанией на Уоллстрит и создал много очень интересных финансовых схем, о которых я планирую рассказать в ближайшем будущем.
А пока о том, что они думают о росте экономике и будущей монетарной политике.
Слово главному экономисту Goldman Sachs Яну Хатциусу
Во-первых, он извиняется, что его предыдущий прогноз относительно роста экономики США не оправдался. Справедливости ради надо сказать, что имеющие конкретную практическую ценность их прогнозы (евро, S&P500) оказались правильными
1. Six months ago, we adopted the view that the economy was transitioning to a more self-sustaining recovery and predicted sequential real GDP growth of 3½%-4% (annualized) in 2011-2012. There were three reasons for our shift: a) a pickup in “organic” growth—GDP excluding the estimated impact of fiscal policy and inventories—to more than 4% in late 2010; b) visible signs of progress in private sector deleveraging, and c) another round of fiscal and monetary stimulus.
2. It hasn’t happened. In fact, organic growth seems to have slowed anew to a below-trend pace in the first half of 2011. Moreover, our Current Activity Indicator (CAI)—a statistical summary of 24 weekly and monthly indicators of economic activity—has slowed from an average of 3.7% in the first quarter to 1.6% in April and a preliminary 1.1% in May. If we take the CAI at face value—and it comports quite well with our judgmental sense of how the data have rolled in—that implies a growth slowdown of about 2½ percentage points in recent months.
3. What accounts for this weakness? The Japanese supply chain disruptions are clearly responsible for some of it, but we think that they explain only about 1 percentage point of the deceleration. (This sounds bigger than the 0.6-point drag on Q2 GDP growth that we have estimated previously, but note that a 1-point deceleration in sequential growth in April and May would be consistent with about a 0.6-percentage point deceleration in Q2 as a whole.) The oil price shock is also clearly important but at least by our estimates does not explain the size of the remaining slowdown. The implication is that we are looking at either a weaker underlying growth pace or a greater vulnerability to shocks than we had been assuming.
4. We are still reluctant to take the deceleration entirely at face value, partly because many of the signs of “healing” in the private sector that encouraged us in late 2010 are still visible. The household debt service burden has come down sharply, household credit quality continues to improve, bank lending standards are easing, and financial conditions remain accommodative. Also, we disagree somewhat with the negative tone of much of the recent housing market coverage in the media, including two front-page articles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal last week on the renewed slide in home prices. It’s true that overall home prices have slipped to fresh lows. But that wasn’t really a surprise; in fact, we and many other housing market observers had expected renewed downward pressure on prices in 2011 given the still-high levels of excess supply. Moreover, according to the CoreLogic house price index, all of the renewed weakness has come in distressed transactions, while prices of non-distressed homes are actually up slightly in 2011 to date on a seasonally adjusted basis. So it is possible that the recent house price weakness simply reflects a greater effort by banks and GSEs to clear out distressed inventory. That would be a sign that the adjustment process has advanced, and not necessarily a cause for alarm.
5. What would be the policy response to a sustained slowdown? We do not expect much. On the fiscal side, we currently assume fiscal restraint of about 1% of GDP in 2012. This is based on the notion that Congress will implement modest discretionary spending cuts, and that the remaining provisions of the 2009 stimulus package as well as part of the late-2010 bipartisan fiscal deal are left to expire. The most stimulative outcome we can imagine is that all of the 2010 provisions—the payroll tax cut, the unemployment benefits, and the depreciation bonus—are extended, but even that assumption would leave some restraint. And it is also possible that the restraint will be larger than our baseline assumption, via deeper discretionary spending cuts and/or a full expiration of the 2010 provisions. Like it or not, fiscal stimulus no longer has strong advocates in Washington, so its time has very likely passed at this point.
6. This puts the onus on monetary policy. And sure enough, markets that not long ago were predicting rate hikes are now starting to debate QE3. But we believe that the Fed’s “zone of inactivity” is much wider than these wild swings might suggest. The hurdle for rate hikes is high, and we feel good about our long-standing view that the funds rate will remain at its current near-zero level until 2013. But the hurdle for QE3 is also high, and indeed much higher than it was for QE2. First, the perceived cost of QE3 is higher because inflation has accelerated. This reflects the fact that at least some of the weakness in growth this year is due to higher commodity prices, i.e. akin to a supply shock. Second, the perceived benefit from QE3 is lower. Fed officials viewed QE1—defined as the overall balance sheet extension that started in late 2008 and ended in early 2010—as a resounding success, and that was probably one reason why they were fairly quick to climb aboard QE2. But they are much less confident that QE2 made a big difference; while it probably did help financial conditions ease and the economy grow a bit more quickly than it otherwise would have done, it’s hard to argue that the effect was large. That has to color their expectations for what QE3 might deliver. And third, the backlash against QE2 both domestically and abroad was greater than Fed officials had anticipated, and they are not keen to subject themselves to another round of similar criticism.
7. So what is the hurdle for QE3? It probably requires either a meaningful rise in the unemployment rate or flat unemployment coupled with a sharp fall in core inflation and inflation expectations. In contrast, if we just trudge along at a trend or slightly below-trend growth rate and inflation stays near its current pace, neither fiscal nor monetary policy are likely to provide fresh support. Such an outcome might not be so bad from the perspective of the equity market, which already seems to be discounting a fairly weak growth pace. But it would be quite bad for the real economy, not least because it would raise the risk that a significant portion of the increase in unemployment—which still looks cyclical rather than structural at this point—will ultimately become “ingrained” via a loss of skills among the long-term unemployed.
Основные мысли:
Препятствия для повышения ставок велики и мы чувствуем себя очень уверенно в отношении нашего долгосрочного взгляда, что ставка по фондам остнется на текущем, близком к нулю уровне до 2013 года. Но препятствия для QE3 тоже велики, и в действительности они гораздо выше, чем это было для QE2.
Ощущаемая выгода от QE3 меньше.
Отрицательная реакция на QE2 внутри страны и за рубежом оказалась больше, чем Фед того ожидал и теперь они не сильно желают стать предметом еще одного раунда подобной критики.
Так что служит препятствием для QE3? Возможно, оно потребует либо существенного роста безработицы, либо безработица останется неизменной, но произойдет резкое падение в базовой инфляции и инфляционных ожиданиях.
Goldman Sachs о китайской экономике
Начиная с 10 мая будет выходить статистика по экономике Китая за май, которая покажет как идет процесс замедления китайской экономики. Продажи автомобилей в мае уже упали второй месяц подряд ( на 13,95% по сравнению с апрелем).
Ожидается, что показатель инфляции в мае в годовом выражении повысится до 5,5% с 5,3% по сравнению с апрелем ввиду рекордной засухи.
В целом Голдман не видит причин бить тревогу.
От Goldman Sachs
China is scheduled to release May economic data from June 10 onwards (Exhibit 1 has the preliminary release schedule). Here are our estimates and thoughts on these upcoming releases:
CPI inflation to rebound amid higher food prices
Food prices have been getting higher in recent weeks as a result of the continued rise in meat (especially pork) prices and the drought in Southern China which pushed up vegetable and seafood prices. We expect non-food CPI inflation to remain subdued amid the slow money and activity growth over the past several months. While commodities such as coal and cement saw higher domestic prices in recent weeks, the impact on PPI inflation will likely lag and show up more visibly in the June PPI data.
We expect May yoy CPI inflation to rise to 5.5%, up from 5.3% in April. This would imply a mom growth of around 5.7% mom s.a. ann., up from 3.5% mom s.a. ann. in April. We expect CPI: food inflation to rise to 12.1% yoy, up from 11.5% yoy in April. Non-food CPI inflation is likely to inch down slightly to 2.6% yoy from 2.7% yoy in April.
PPI inflation is likely to moderate to 6.4% yoy in May, down from 6.8% yoy in April. This implies a sequential growth of 0.1% mom s.a. ann.
Industrial activity growth to rebound
The official and HSBC PMI indices both suggested a stabilization of industrial activities in May (the official readings both went down but after adjusting for seasonality both went up). We believe the driver of the rebound (from a very low level in April) probably came from the supply side as supposed to demand side. Anecdotal evidence suggests there were much fewer cases of power cuts throughout May compared with April and supply-chain disruptions because of the Japan earthquake have been disappearing quickly as well. On the other hand, we do not see any major rebound on the demand side as there has been continued domestic policy tightening which restricts domestic demand growth and was the main driver of the significant slowdown in activity growth since the start of the year including April and further evidence of softening external demand growth, especially in the US.
Specifically, we expect May industrial production (IP) growth to rise to 13.9% yoy, up from 13.4% yoy in April. This would imply a sequential growth of 7.1% mom s.a. ann., up from the -7.7% mom s.a. ann. growth in April.
We expect fixed asset investment (FAI) growth to soften to 25.3% yoy in January-May from 25.4% yoy in January-April. The implied May FAI growth is 25.1% yoy, down from 26.1% yoy in April.
We expect May retail sales growth to rise to 17.3% yoy, up from 17.1% yoy in April amid higher consumer price inflation.
Export growth to moderate
We expect May export growth to moderate to 20.0% yoy, down from 29.9% yoy in April. This would imply a mom s.a. ann. growth of around 25.5% in May, down from 26.9% in April. While this is still a high level of growth, it is significantly lower than the 40%+ average sequential growth over the previous 6 months.
Meanwhile, we expect May import growth to rise to 26.0% yoy, up from 21.8% yoy in April. This would imply a sequential growth of around -1.2% mom s.a. ann. in May, up from -25.0% mom s.a. ann. in April.
The implied trade surplus is US$16.6 billion, up from US$11.4 billion in April.
Broad money supply growth to remain low
Our channel checks with commercial banks suggest there have been continued restrictions on credit expansion and probably stricter than they were in April. We view this as the most important biding constraint on credit growth as loan demand remains beyond the comfort level of the government.
We expect the amount of CNY loans made in May to fall to around Rmb600 billion, from Rmb739.6 billion in April. The yoy growth of CNY loans should likely fall to 17.1%, down from 17.5% in April. The implied sequential growth is 17.0% mom s.a. ann., up from to the
10.6% mom s.a. ann. in April.
We believe yoy M2 growth is likely to fall to 15.0% yoy, down from 15.3% yoy in April. Sequential growth should rise to 13.1% mom s.a. ann., up from 3.6% mom s.a. ann. in April.
В таблице данные важнейшей китайской статистики за последние полтора года и прогноз GS за май с датами выхода статистики
Юридические нюансы греческого греческого долга
Главный вопрос, который волнует всех инвесторов – вызовет ли реструктуризация греческого долга срабатывание CDS.
90% всех греческих облигаций регулируется греческим законом, а 10% английским.
Греческий закон требует, чтобы все 100% инвесторов согласились с условиями, иначе будет дефолт. А это почти невозможно.
Citigroup об этом более подробно
Legal Characteristics of Greek Government bonds
After the question of whether or not a restructuring will occur and when, the next most important question for most investors is whether or not it can be done in such a way as to not trigger CDS. Lee Buchheit3 has indentified several aspects of Greek debt that are relevant. In particular, the large amount of domestic debt without features such as cross defaults and negative pledges should facilitate a number of restructuring options.
There are €327bn of outstanding Greek government bond debt, of which €9.8bn are treasury bills. Of the total, less than 2% is in dollars, yen, Swiss francs or other foreign currency. From a legal standpoint, the most striking feature is that 90% of the total bonds are governed by Greek law with the majority of the remainder under English law. Figure 2 illustrates that a large portion of the international debt is only due after 2016. These factors have significant implications for Greece’s options if they decide to go down the restructuring route.
Greek law bonds have no Collective Action Clauses (CACs) which mean that voluntary restructurings require 100% of investors to accept the new terms in order to avoid triggering a default, an almost impossible hurdle. Greek sovereign bonds issued under English law prior to 2004 have CACs which permit 66% of bondholders consent to modify terms that would bind all holders. Post 2004 75% of bondholders consent is required but the scope of potential revisions is broader.
The situation is similar for negative pledges which are only found in English law debt. The clause requires Greece equally and ratably to secure each of the bond issues if ever it creates a security interest over its revenues, properties or assets to secure any external indebtedness. This is normally applied to foreign currency borrowings and only really makes sense prior to Greece joining the Euro. Therefore, negative pledges in euros only really apply to bonds issued after 2004, a relatively small percentage.
Equally, cross-acceleration, cross-default and moratorium event of default clauses only apply to international debt denominated in currencies other than euros. Therefore bondholder remedies such as acceleration are only relevant to a very small percentage of debt issued before 2004.
Given that the percentage of bonds with difficult clauses is relatively small, Greece could presumably offer some form of tender, additional collateral or waiver for them. This opens up a number of possibilities. For example, it would be able to collateralize a future Euro-denominated issue of securities in a European version of Brady bonds. Or alternatively, obtain a partial guarantee of the new instruments from a creditworthy party as the Seychelles did recently.
На рисунке показан профиль погашения греческого долга
http://mfd.ru/ (C) Источник
Не является индивидуальной инвестиционной рекомендацией
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Они везде. Goldman Sachs не прочь даже возглавить превращение России в мировой финансовый центр
Goldman Sachs является наиболее «инновационной» компанией на Уоллстрит и создал много очень интересных финансовых схем, о которых я планирую рассказать в ближайшем будущем.
А пока о том, что они думают о росте экономике и будущей монетарной политике.
Слово главному экономисту Goldman Sachs Яну Хатциусу
Во-первых, он извиняется, что его предыдущий прогноз относительно роста экономики США не оправдался. Справедливости ради надо сказать, что имеющие конкретную практическую ценность их прогнозы (евро, S&P500) оказались правильными
1. Six months ago, we adopted the view that the economy was transitioning to a more self-sustaining recovery and predicted sequential real GDP growth of 3½%-4% (annualized) in 2011-2012. There were three reasons for our shift: a) a pickup in “organic” growth—GDP excluding the estimated impact of fiscal policy and inventories—to more than 4% in late 2010; b) visible signs of progress in private sector deleveraging, and c) another round of fiscal and monetary stimulus.
2. It hasn’t happened. In fact, organic growth seems to have slowed anew to a below-trend pace in the first half of 2011. Moreover, our Current Activity Indicator (CAI)—a statistical summary of 24 weekly and monthly indicators of economic activity—has slowed from an average of 3.7% in the first quarter to 1.6% in April and a preliminary 1.1% in May. If we take the CAI at face value—and it comports quite well with our judgmental sense of how the data have rolled in—that implies a growth slowdown of about 2½ percentage points in recent months.
3. What accounts for this weakness? The Japanese supply chain disruptions are clearly responsible for some of it, but we think that they explain only about 1 percentage point of the deceleration. (This sounds bigger than the 0.6-point drag on Q2 GDP growth that we have estimated previously, but note that a 1-point deceleration in sequential growth in April and May would be consistent with about a 0.6-percentage point deceleration in Q2 as a whole.) The oil price shock is also clearly important but at least by our estimates does not explain the size of the remaining slowdown. The implication is that we are looking at either a weaker underlying growth pace or a greater vulnerability to shocks than we had been assuming.
4. We are still reluctant to take the deceleration entirely at face value, partly because many of the signs of “healing” in the private sector that encouraged us in late 2010 are still visible. The household debt service burden has come down sharply, household credit quality continues to improve, bank lending standards are easing, and financial conditions remain accommodative. Also, we disagree somewhat with the negative tone of much of the recent housing market coverage in the media, including two front-page articles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal last week on the renewed slide in home prices. It’s true that overall home prices have slipped to fresh lows. But that wasn’t really a surprise; in fact, we and many other housing market observers had expected renewed downward pressure on prices in 2011 given the still-high levels of excess supply. Moreover, according to the CoreLogic house price index, all of the renewed weakness has come in distressed transactions, while prices of non-distressed homes are actually up slightly in 2011 to date on a seasonally adjusted basis. So it is possible that the recent house price weakness simply reflects a greater effort by banks and GSEs to clear out distressed inventory. That would be a sign that the adjustment process has advanced, and not necessarily a cause for alarm.
5. What would be the policy response to a sustained slowdown? We do not expect much. On the fiscal side, we currently assume fiscal restraint of about 1% of GDP in 2012. This is based on the notion that Congress will implement modest discretionary spending cuts, and that the remaining provisions of the 2009 stimulus package as well as part of the late-2010 bipartisan fiscal deal are left to expire. The most stimulative outcome we can imagine is that all of the 2010 provisions—the payroll tax cut, the unemployment benefits, and the depreciation bonus—are extended, but even that assumption would leave some restraint. And it is also possible that the restraint will be larger than our baseline assumption, via deeper discretionary spending cuts and/or a full expiration of the 2010 provisions. Like it or not, fiscal stimulus no longer has strong advocates in Washington, so its time has very likely passed at this point.
6. This puts the onus on monetary policy. And sure enough, markets that not long ago were predicting rate hikes are now starting to debate QE3. But we believe that the Fed’s “zone of inactivity” is much wider than these wild swings might suggest. The hurdle for rate hikes is high, and we feel good about our long-standing view that the funds rate will remain at its current near-zero level until 2013. But the hurdle for QE3 is also high, and indeed much higher than it was for QE2. First, the perceived cost of QE3 is higher because inflation has accelerated. This reflects the fact that at least some of the weakness in growth this year is due to higher commodity prices, i.e. akin to a supply shock. Second, the perceived benefit from QE3 is lower. Fed officials viewed QE1—defined as the overall balance sheet extension that started in late 2008 and ended in early 2010—as a resounding success, and that was probably one reason why they were fairly quick to climb aboard QE2. But they are much less confident that QE2 made a big difference; while it probably did help financial conditions ease and the economy grow a bit more quickly than it otherwise would have done, it’s hard to argue that the effect was large. That has to color their expectations for what QE3 might deliver. And third, the backlash against QE2 both domestically and abroad was greater than Fed officials had anticipated, and they are not keen to subject themselves to another round of similar criticism.
7. So what is the hurdle for QE3? It probably requires either a meaningful rise in the unemployment rate or flat unemployment coupled with a sharp fall in core inflation and inflation expectations. In contrast, if we just trudge along at a trend or slightly below-trend growth rate and inflation stays near its current pace, neither fiscal nor monetary policy are likely to provide fresh support. Such an outcome might not be so bad from the perspective of the equity market, which already seems to be discounting a fairly weak growth pace. But it would be quite bad for the real economy, not least because it would raise the risk that a significant portion of the increase in unemployment—which still looks cyclical rather than structural at this point—will ultimately become “ingrained” via a loss of skills among the long-term unemployed.
Основные мысли:
Препятствия для повышения ставок велики и мы чувствуем себя очень уверенно в отношении нашего долгосрочного взгляда, что ставка по фондам остнется на текущем, близком к нулю уровне до 2013 года. Но препятствия для QE3 тоже велики, и в действительности они гораздо выше, чем это было для QE2.
Ощущаемая выгода от QE3 меньше.
Отрицательная реакция на QE2 внутри страны и за рубежом оказалась больше, чем Фед того ожидал и теперь они не сильно желают стать предметом еще одного раунда подобной критики.
Так что служит препятствием для QE3? Возможно, оно потребует либо существенного роста безработицы, либо безработица останется неизменной, но произойдет резкое падение в базовой инфляции и инфляционных ожиданиях.
Goldman Sachs о китайской экономике
Начиная с 10 мая будет выходить статистика по экономике Китая за май, которая покажет как идет процесс замедления китайской экономики. Продажи автомобилей в мае уже упали второй месяц подряд ( на 13,95% по сравнению с апрелем).
Ожидается, что показатель инфляции в мае в годовом выражении повысится до 5,5% с 5,3% по сравнению с апрелем ввиду рекордной засухи.
В целом Голдман не видит причин бить тревогу.
От Goldman Sachs
China is scheduled to release May economic data from June 10 onwards (Exhibit 1 has the preliminary release schedule). Here are our estimates and thoughts on these upcoming releases:
CPI inflation to rebound amid higher food prices
Food prices have been getting higher in recent weeks as a result of the continued rise in meat (especially pork) prices and the drought in Southern China which pushed up vegetable and seafood prices. We expect non-food CPI inflation to remain subdued amid the slow money and activity growth over the past several months. While commodities such as coal and cement saw higher domestic prices in recent weeks, the impact on PPI inflation will likely lag and show up more visibly in the June PPI data.
We expect May yoy CPI inflation to rise to 5.5%, up from 5.3% in April. This would imply a mom growth of around 5.7% mom s.a. ann., up from 3.5% mom s.a. ann. in April. We expect CPI: food inflation to rise to 12.1% yoy, up from 11.5% yoy in April. Non-food CPI inflation is likely to inch down slightly to 2.6% yoy from 2.7% yoy in April.
PPI inflation is likely to moderate to 6.4% yoy in May, down from 6.8% yoy in April. This implies a sequential growth of 0.1% mom s.a. ann.
Industrial activity growth to rebound
The official and HSBC PMI indices both suggested a stabilization of industrial activities in May (the official readings both went down but after adjusting for seasonality both went up). We believe the driver of the rebound (from a very low level in April) probably came from the supply side as supposed to demand side. Anecdotal evidence suggests there were much fewer cases of power cuts throughout May compared with April and supply-chain disruptions because of the Japan earthquake have been disappearing quickly as well. On the other hand, we do not see any major rebound on the demand side as there has been continued domestic policy tightening which restricts domestic demand growth and was the main driver of the significant slowdown in activity growth since the start of the year including April and further evidence of softening external demand growth, especially in the US.
Specifically, we expect May industrial production (IP) growth to rise to 13.9% yoy, up from 13.4% yoy in April. This would imply a sequential growth of 7.1% mom s.a. ann., up from the -7.7% mom s.a. ann. growth in April.
We expect fixed asset investment (FAI) growth to soften to 25.3% yoy in January-May from 25.4% yoy in January-April. The implied May FAI growth is 25.1% yoy, down from 26.1% yoy in April.
We expect May retail sales growth to rise to 17.3% yoy, up from 17.1% yoy in April amid higher consumer price inflation.
Export growth to moderate
We expect May export growth to moderate to 20.0% yoy, down from 29.9% yoy in April. This would imply a mom s.a. ann. growth of around 25.5% in May, down from 26.9% in April. While this is still a high level of growth, it is significantly lower than the 40%+ average sequential growth over the previous 6 months.
Meanwhile, we expect May import growth to rise to 26.0% yoy, up from 21.8% yoy in April. This would imply a sequential growth of around -1.2% mom s.a. ann. in May, up from -25.0% mom s.a. ann. in April.
The implied trade surplus is US$16.6 billion, up from US$11.4 billion in April.
Broad money supply growth to remain low
Our channel checks with commercial banks suggest there have been continued restrictions on credit expansion and probably stricter than they were in April. We view this as the most important biding constraint on credit growth as loan demand remains beyond the comfort level of the government.
We expect the amount of CNY loans made in May to fall to around Rmb600 billion, from Rmb739.6 billion in April. The yoy growth of CNY loans should likely fall to 17.1%, down from 17.5% in April. The implied sequential growth is 17.0% mom s.a. ann., up from to the
10.6% mom s.a. ann. in April.
We believe yoy M2 growth is likely to fall to 15.0% yoy, down from 15.3% yoy in April. Sequential growth should rise to 13.1% mom s.a. ann., up from 3.6% mom s.a. ann. in April.
В таблице данные важнейшей китайской статистики за последние полтора года и прогноз GS за май с датами выхода статистики
Юридические нюансы греческого греческого долга
Главный вопрос, который волнует всех инвесторов – вызовет ли реструктуризация греческого долга срабатывание CDS.
90% всех греческих облигаций регулируется греческим законом, а 10% английским.
Греческий закон требует, чтобы все 100% инвесторов согласились с условиями, иначе будет дефолт. А это почти невозможно.
Citigroup об этом более подробно
Legal Characteristics of Greek Government bonds
After the question of whether or not a restructuring will occur and when, the next most important question for most investors is whether or not it can be done in such a way as to not trigger CDS. Lee Buchheit3 has indentified several aspects of Greek debt that are relevant. In particular, the large amount of domestic debt without features such as cross defaults and negative pledges should facilitate a number of restructuring options.
There are €327bn of outstanding Greek government bond debt, of which €9.8bn are treasury bills. Of the total, less than 2% is in dollars, yen, Swiss francs or other foreign currency. From a legal standpoint, the most striking feature is that 90% of the total bonds are governed by Greek law with the majority of the remainder under English law. Figure 2 illustrates that a large portion of the international debt is only due after 2016. These factors have significant implications for Greece’s options if they decide to go down the restructuring route.
Greek law bonds have no Collective Action Clauses (CACs) which mean that voluntary restructurings require 100% of investors to accept the new terms in order to avoid triggering a default, an almost impossible hurdle. Greek sovereign bonds issued under English law prior to 2004 have CACs which permit 66% of bondholders consent to modify terms that would bind all holders. Post 2004 75% of bondholders consent is required but the scope of potential revisions is broader.
The situation is similar for negative pledges which are only found in English law debt. The clause requires Greece equally and ratably to secure each of the bond issues if ever it creates a security interest over its revenues, properties or assets to secure any external indebtedness. This is normally applied to foreign currency borrowings and only really makes sense prior to Greece joining the Euro. Therefore, negative pledges in euros only really apply to bonds issued after 2004, a relatively small percentage.
Equally, cross-acceleration, cross-default and moratorium event of default clauses only apply to international debt denominated in currencies other than euros. Therefore bondholder remedies such as acceleration are only relevant to a very small percentage of debt issued before 2004.
Given that the percentage of bonds with difficult clauses is relatively small, Greece could presumably offer some form of tender, additional collateral or waiver for them. This opens up a number of possibilities. For example, it would be able to collateralize a future Euro-denominated issue of securities in a European version of Brady bonds. Or alternatively, obtain a partial guarantee of the new instruments from a creditworthy party as the Seychelles did recently.
На рисунке показан профиль погашения греческого долга
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